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THE BEIRA BLOCKADE
BY
ALAN WHARAM, M.A. (Cantab.), 
of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law,
Senior Lecturer in Law at Leeds College of Commerce.
This is the third in Mr. Wharam’s series o f articles on the legal 
implications o f U.D.I. (See [1967] C.L.J. 189 and 1969 R.L.J. 21.) In 
this article Mr. Wharam examines the possible defences that might be 
available to members o f the Royal Navy i f  they were prosecuted for  
causing loss o f life or damage to property in pursuance o f the blockade.
His conclusion is that no defence recognized by English law 
would be available, but the Crown would presumably not prosecute, 
and i f  a private prosecution were instituted one may suppose that the 
Attorney-General would issue a nolle prosequi. A foreign country 
whose subjects were the victims might or might not demand extradition, 
in which event the Crown would no doubt refuse to surrender its servants 
on the ground that the alleged crime r a s  o f a political nature.
On 6th April 1966, the Security Council of the United Nations 
called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to blockade Beira 
and if necessary to use force against any ship believed to be carrying oil 
to Rhodesia: the relevant part of the resolution reads as follows:
“The Security Council calls upon the Government of the United 
Kingdom . . .  to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival 
at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for 
Southern Rhodesia.”
It is not known what orders were given by the Crown to those of its 
servants1 who were appointed to carry out this resolution, but there are 
really only two methods by which a blockade can be made effective, 
namely by sending a boarding party on a suspected ship, or by firing at, 
and in the last resort sinking it. It is clear that if either of these courses 
were to be adopted, men might be injured or killed and property would be 
damaged or destroyed. Conduct of this nature, committed on the high 
seas in time of peace, would normally be regarded as a monstrous out­
1 In A. G. v. Nissan (1969) 2 W.I..R. 926, it was held by the House of Lords, inter alia, 
that a member of the armed services of the Crown does not cease to be a Crown servant 
even if acting directly under U.N. command.
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rage, and in all jurisdictions would no doubt be treated as criminal. The 
purpose of this article is to consider what defences, if any, would be 
available to members of the Royal Navy if, in carrying out their orders, 
they caused loss of life or damage to property, and were subsequently 
prosecuted on criminal charges.
The problems involved, especially from the point of view of those 
whose experience is limited to practising in our own criminal courts, 
are difficult and unusual. There can be no statute governing the situa­
tion: of binding authorities there are none; even persuasive precedents 
are virtually non-existent. Furthermore, as the situation has so far re­
mained purely hypothetical, there are many uncertain factors: one cannot 
foresee the nationality of a potential blockade-runner or its crew and 
therefore one cannot know the details of its jurisprudence;2 and some 
countries would possibly ignore the episode and refrain from enforcing 
their rights. However, some guidance may be obtained from considering 
the following questions.
1. In what circumstances may British subjects be killed with impunity?
It seems logical to suppose that the Crown has no greater right to 
kill aliens while they are assisting British subjects than it has to kill British 
subjects themselves: and conversely, where it can put British subjects to 
death, it can do the same to anyone who aids them.
The law relating to the circumstances in which a British subject may 
be killed with impunity, usually referred to as justifiable homicide, is 
summarised in Blackstone's Commentaries * Some of the situations listed 
by Blackstone (e.g., the death of a champion in trial by “battel”) are 
obsolete: others (e.g., the death of an escaping prisoner) are totally 
irrelevant. The learned author noted, however, that homicide was justi­
fiable when committed for the advancement of public justice, as when an 
officer, attempting lawfully to arrest a criminal, is assaulted by the 
criminal, or when officers are endeavouring to disperse a riot or a re­
bellious assembly; but only where there is an absolute necessity on the 
officer’s side, namely that the criminal could not be arrested or the riot 
suppressed unless such homicide were committed. Homicide is also 
justifiable if committed to prevent any forcible and atrocious crime. The 
uniform principle that seemed, to Blackstone, to run through our own and 
other laws is this: that where a criminal is endeavouring to commit by 
force a crime which is itself capital, it is lawful to repel that force by the 
death of the person committing the crime.
2 Even as near home as Jersey there was, as recently as 1936, no clear distinction between 
murder, manslaughter and death in a chance medley: see Henouf v. A.G. for Jersey 
[1936] A.C. 445.
2 Vol. 4 (1809 ed.), 178-181:1 have condensed and paraphrased the original text.
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As far as I am aware there has been no addition to the list of justi­
fiable homicides in the last two hundred years;4 and on the face of it 
none could possibly apply to the Rhodesian situation. However, in view 
of the repeated allegations of rebellion made against the Rhodesians, this 
particular point requires examination.
According to the law dictionaries, the term rebellion means “ the 
taking up of arms traitorously against the Crown, whether by natural 
subjects or others when once subdued” ; and throughout the State Trials 
the term was invariably used as a synonym for levying war contrary to the 
Treason Act, 1351: save that, whereas in order to constitute treason under 
the Act, the war had to be levied within the realm, a rebellion could occur 
anywhere.
The question was considered in Phillips v. Eyre:5 in that case, there 
had been a conspiracy in Jamaica to overthrow the government, and in 
pursuance of the conspiracy great numbers of the inhabitants had broken 
out into open rebellion, and had committed many burglaries, robberies, 
arsons, murders and other felonies: the civil power had been overthrown 
by the rebels, but the Governor, with the assistance of the armed forces, 
had arrested the rebellion. In considering this situation, Willes J., deliver­
ing the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, quoted a long 
passage from Tindal C.J.’s direction to the jury in the Bristol riots case.6 
He then went on:7
“And if such duty exist as to [suppressing] tumultuous assemblies 
of a dangerous character, the duty and responsibility in case of open 
rebellion are heightened by the consideration that the existence of 
law itself is threatened by force of arms and a state of war against 
the Crown established for the time. To act under such circumstances 
within the precise limits of the law of ordinary peace is a difficult 
and may be an impossible task and to hesitate or temporize may 
entail disastrous consequences. . . .  It is manifest . . . that there may 
be occasions in which the necessity of the case demands prompt and 
speedy action for the maintenance of law and order at whatever 
risk. . . . The governor may have . . .  to arm loyal subjects, to seize 
or secure arms, to intercept munitions of war, to cut off communica­
tion with the disaffected, to detain suspected persons and even to 
meet armed force by armed force in the open field.”
During the present century, the situation was again considered at the
4 See the current edition of Archbold, para. 2550.
5 (1870) L.R.6 Q.B.l.
6 (1832) 5 C. & P. at 262, in which Tindal C. J. had referred to the Case o f Arms (1597) 
Pop. 121 and R. v. Inhabitants of Wigan (1749) 1 W.B1. 47.
7 0870) L.R.6. Q.B. at 16.
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time of the Irish civil war in R. v. Allen:* after listing some of the better 
known rebellions in English and Irish history, Molony C.J. said :9
“Unlike the armed insurrections of the past, where the insur­
gents met the Crown forces in actual battle, the present insurrection 
consists exclusively of warfare of a guerilla character, the nature of 
which is explained by Sir Nevil Macready in the following words: 
‘The scheme of the said warfare does not entail lighting in distinctive 
uniforms, or in accordance with the laws of war, but under a system 
of guerilla attacks, in which inhabitants, apparently pursuing peaceful 
avocations, constantly come together and carry out guerilla opera­
tions, which often result in the death of or serious injuries to members 
of His Majesty’s forces and police at the hands of the people who 
are posing as peaceful citizens.’ During the continuance of such a 
state of affairs . . . the Government is entitled and, indeed, bound to 
repel force by force, and thereby to put down the insurrection and 
restore public order.”
The state of affairs in Rhodesia has never borne the slightest resemblance 
to the insurrection in Jamaica or the civil war in Ireland: there is nothing 
in the judgments in either of these cases, or, as far as I am aware, anywhere 
else in the reports, which suggests that force can be used except in the 
type of situation described there. In short, there has been no rebellion in 
Rhodesia and the Crown could not justify the use of force by pretending 
that there has.10 It would appear to follow, therefore, that force cannot 
be used against the nationals of any other state who befriend them.
2. Could an attack upon a blockade runner be treated as an act of war?
There is a dearth of recent English authority11 on the law relating to 
the outbreak of war, but the summary by Lord Wrenbury in British and
8 (1921) 2 I.R. 241. —  ’
» At 268.
10 In an article published in the Yorkshire Post on 30th December, 1967, I expressed the 
view that if force were used against Rhodesia and Rhodesian citizens were killed in the 
process, those responsible would have no defence to a charge of murder: if I fell into 
error, no one has enlightened me.
This is not the first occasion on which the ministers of the Crown have adopted this 
policy. In the reign of Henry V, Sir John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham, the Lollard, was 
hanged and burnt to death as a heretic: Tennyson, whose standards as a poet were not 
consistent, but who had a firm grasp of the legal implications, commented on this 
episode as follows:
But the king—nor voice
Nor finger raised against him—took and hanged,
Took, hanged and burnt—how many—thirty-nine—
Called it rebellion—hanged poor friends as rebels 
And burnt as heretics! For your Priest 
Labels—to take the king along with him—
All heresy treason: but to call men traitors 
May make men traitors.
(My italics). And see further my article “Treason in Rhodesia” at (1967) Cam. 
L.J. 189.
11 The whole matter was exhaustively reviewed 300 years ago by Hale, 1 H.P.C., ch. 15.
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Foreign Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Samuel Sunday & Co.12 seems 
unobjectionable:
“A declaration of war by the Sovereign is a political or executive 
act, done by virtue of his prerogative, which creates a state of war. 
A state of war is a lawful state, and is one in which every subject of 
His Majesty becomes an enemy of the nation against which war is 
declared. The declaration of war amounts to an order to every subject 
of the Crown to conduct himself in such way as he is bound to 
conduct himself in a state of war. It is an order to every militant 
subject to light as he shall be directed, and an order to every civilian 
subject to cease to trade with the enemy.”
It is quite inconceivable that the Crown should delegate to its naval 
commanders the power to bring about the situation here described by 
attacking some ship, of whose activities its parent government would in 
all probability know nothing.
It is true that the Geneva Convention applies to :
“all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognised by one of them” 13
but it is hard to see how even this definition could cover an attack upon 
an individual ship, and if that is correct Royal Naval personnel could not, 
if captured, take advantage of the protection afforded to prisoners of 
war.
3. Could a blockade runner be treated as a pirate?
It is on the face of it absurd to suppose that a merchant ship, albeit 
carrying contraband cargo, could be regarded as a pirate, and this ques­
tion can therefore be disposed of briefly. Although the correct definition 
of the term piracy for purposes of international law is open to doubt, the 
general conception is clear enough, namely that there must be some use 
of violence or force, or an attempt to use violence or force, in order to 
despoil merchants of their goods: it is quite clear that this matter is 
totally irrelevant.14
12 [1916] 1 A.C. 650 at 671.
13 Geneva Conventions Act, 1957, sch. 2, art. 2.
14 The whole question was reviewed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] A.C. 586.
It may be noted in passing that, by the Piracy Act, 1721, which applies to anyone 
within the jurisdiction of our courts (and therefore to officers and men of the Royal 
Navy), if any persons belonging to any ship or vessel whatsoever, upon meeting any 
merchant ship on the high seas, shall forcibly board or enter it, and shall throw over­
board or destroy any of the goods or merchandise, they shall be treated as pirates, and, 
by the Piracy Act, 1837, the Penal Servitude Act, 1857, and the Criminal Justice Act, 
1948, shall be liable to life imprisonment. Although piracy can normally be committed 
only by someone who is not authorised by the state of which he is a national, the exem­
ption does not apparently apply here.
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4. Can the Crown blockade a dissident colony?
Undoubtedly colonies, or recessionist states, have been blockaded 
in the past, although it is not clear on what basis or to what extent this 
may be done. It is well established that, under our law, the Crown may 
create harbours and ports under the royal prerogative;13 *678 whether they 
can be closed again by the Crown1® or only by statute is open to question, 
but there can be little doubt that ports can be closed17 by one means or 
the other. It may be supposed that other nations have similar powers to 
close their ports, and the blockade of colonies, etc., may have been 
founded upon this right.18 Beira, however, is not a British port.
Alternatively it seems clear that a mother-state may blockade an 
insurgent dependency in order to suppress it. This was certainly the 
course adopted by the U.S.A. during the Civil War. The time-table of 
events here must be carefully noted.
Lincoln won the presidential election in the autumn of 1860: on 20th 
December 1860, by the Secession Ordinance, South Carolina declared 
herself independent,19 followed shortly afterwards by six other southern 
states: the Confederacy was formed at Memphis on 8th February 1861, 
and Jefferson Davis was elected president on 10th February. By the 
beginning of March, all the U.S. forts and dockyards in the south, except 
Fort Pickens (Alabama) and Fort Sumter (South Carolina) had been 
occupied without resistance. On 12th April, however, the secessionists 
bombarded Fort Sumter and the U.S. troops surrendered on the following 
day; on 17th April President Davis invited applications for letters of 
marque,20 a clear demonstration of an intention to wage war; and on 
19th April President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports. 
Thereafter military and naval operations were conducted on a consider­
able scale: no one could question that the Confederacy was levying war 
against the United States. It was not until November that the British 
steamer Trent was boarded from U.S.S. San Jacinto, and two Confederate 
agents were forcibly removed. Once this had been accepted, the blockade
13 See particular Blackstone's Commentaries (1809 ed.), vol. I, p. 264, and Hatherley L.C.’s
remarks in Foreman v. Free Fishers and Dredgers o f Whitstable (1869) L.R.4 H.L.266
at 281.
16 Case o f Impositions (Bates' Case) (1610) 3 St. Tr. 371.
17 The reason in peacetime would be to regulate imports and customs.
18 One of the complaints contained in the American Declaration of Independence (the 
full text of which is to be found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica) is that the Crown was 
interfering with colonial trade: the reference, however, is not clear and almost impossible 
to verify.
19 Whether she was lawfully entitled to do this is, I understand, still a matter of dispute 
among American lawyers.
20 Letters of marque were issued to private citizens to enable them to attack foreigners at 
sea without the risk of being treated as robbers or pirates: Blackstone, vol. I pp. 238-9. 
They had in fact already been banned for the purposes of international law by the 
Treaty of Paris, 1856.
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of southern ports by the U.S. Government continued until the end of the 
war.
From these facts it is quite clear that the U.S.A. did not impose a 
blockade until the Confederate states were in a state of rebellion as the 
term was understood in contemporary English law ;22 it was imposed 
for the express purpose of suppressing the rebellion;21 3 and it was not 
enforced until after the war had been in progress for some months to 
the common knowledge of the world. The Rhodesian situation, on the 
other hand, although analogous to that of South Carolina during the 
first three months of 1860, has been of a totally different nature. Any 
attempt to compare the British blockade of Beira with the U.S. blockade 
of the Confederacy would be totally false.
5. What is the effect of the U.N. resolutions?
Whichever way one approaches this problem, one is driven to the 
same conclusion: that the blockade of Beira is totally unjustifiable and 
could not be lawfully enforced. This is, of course, subject to the possi­
bility that the United Nations can change the law and render lawful 
what would otherwise be unlawful.
When the United Nations Organisation was founded, its original 
members subscribed to the Charter. It is stated in article 2 (1) that the 
Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of its 
members, but by article 2 (2) they agree to fulfil the obligation assumed by 
them in accordance with the Charter: to this extent, therefore, member 
nations can be said to be bound by resolutions passed by the Security 
Council as a representative body of the Organisation. There is nothing 
in the Charter—presumably it never occurred to the draftsmen that it 
might be necessary to say so in express terms—which requires members 
to obey resolutions which are not passed in accordance with the procedure 
laid down; still less are members required to obey resolutions which are 
expressly forbidden by the Charter. It is very difficult to avoid the con­
clusion that the Security Council resolutions relating to Rhodesia fell 
into the latter category.
If Rhodesia was at the material times a dependency or dominion of 
the Crown, as the Crown has always maintained, then the whole matter
21 Morison and Commager, Growth o f the American Republic, passim.
22 Levying war against the U.S. constitutes treason for the purposes of Article 111(3) 
of the Constitution.
23 If the view of the southern lawyers was correct and the Confederate states were legally 
independent, the blockade was still lawfully imposed as an act of war comparable to 
that imposed by Great Britain upon France half a century earlier and Germany half a 
century later.
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was outside the jurisdiction of the U.N. by virtue of article 2 (7):24 and 
this is not affected by the proviso, for a measure can obviously not be 
lawfully enforced if the measure itself was unlawfully imposed in the 
first place. If, on the other hand, Rhodesia has become an independent 
state at any stage, then article 3225 comes into operation; not only was 
Rhodesia not invited to participate but her repeated requests to be allowed 
to do so were either ignored or rejected. Quite apart from the terms of 
the Charter, this was a flagrant violation of the rule of natural justice 
as it has been understood in both common law and civil law jurisprudence 
for centuries:26 the decision of any inferior tribunal in England, had it 
adopted the procedure followed by the Security Council, would without 
a shadow of doubt have been quashed by the High Court by order of 
certiorari.
Under article 39, the Security Council “shall determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace” and shall make recommendations or decide 
what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore peace and security: 
somewhat surprisingly no criteria are laid down as to what constitutes a 
threat to the peace so the Security Council may apparently (although 
it is difficult to believe that the founding members intended this) deter­
mine that some purely fictional threat to the peace exists.27 However, the 
whole of Chapter VII (articles 39 to 51) is governed by article 33 (l)28 
which requires the parties to a dispute to attempt to settle it first of all 
by negotiation. When the Security Council passed its resolution on 6th 
April 1966, it was obvious that most of the recommended methods of 
negotiation had not even been attempted, and it is a matter of common 
knowledge that negotiations continued intermittently for at least two 
years afterwards. It is submitted that the total disregard of article 33 (1) 
invalidates the Security Council’s recommendations entirely: probably,
24 “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII.”
25 “Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council 
or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute 
under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without 
vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.”
26 Blackstone, vol. 4, p. 283.
27 By article 34, the Security Council may investigate a situation in order to determine 
whether a threat to peace exists: but the article is not mandatory and a failure to carry 
out its provisions, however reprehensible, would not affect the validity of the ensuing 
determination.
28 “The parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the main­
tenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia­
tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”
In addition, by article 36(3) the Security Council should take into account that legal 
disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court: 
this article is not mandatory, but was completely ignored.
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indeed, they had no jurisdiction to consider the matter at all.
Finally, article 27 (3)29 requires the unanimous vote of all the per­
manent members of the Council: this was not achieved.30 It is true that 
on various previous occasions the abstention of a permanent member 
has been treated as not amounting to a veto, but the wording of the 
article is quite clear. In any event, one would have supposed that H.M.’s 
ministers, when putting at risk the lives of their own and foreign seamen, 
would have been well advised to abide by the strict letter of the law.
If the Security Council had deliberately set out to violate as many of 
the provisions of the Charter as it could, it is difficult to see how it could 
have been more successful: and this was done with the collusion, if not 
the connivance, of the British Government.31 The views of other nations 
vary widely: some have done their best to enforce sanctions; some have 
paid lip service to them; some have disregarded them; some nations are 
not members of the U.N. There is some precedent for saying that one 
nation, by entering into a treaty with another, may delegate to the latter 
the power to stop and search its ships;32 3presumably, therefore, members 
of the U.N. would by analogy be bound to observe the provisions of a 
valid resolution of the Security Council: how many governments would 
seek to uphold the validity of any of the resolutions relating to Rhodesia, 
especially in the face of the uproar which would inevitably arise if any 
of their nationals were killed or their ships sunk on the high seas, can 
only be a matter for speculation.
6. What steps could be taken if  offences were committed?
It seems to me that the most likely, and the most dangerous situation 
which might arise would be for a boarding-party to board a foreign ship, 
for a member of the defending crew to be killed or injured in the ensuing 
scuffle and for the ship then to sail to some place from where the boarding- 
party could not be rescued. In this situation, the British Government 
would lose control over the situation (except in so far as diplomatic 
pressure could be exerted) and, if any crimes had been committed, the
2» "Decisions of the Security Council (except on procedural matters) shall be made by 
an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members.” The French text is even more emphatic on this point, requiring “les roix de 
tons les membres permanent."
30 Russia and France both abstained on 6th April 1966 and again when mandatory san­
ctions were imposed on 16th December, 1966.
31 Mr. Dean Acheson, in his address to the American Bar Association on 24th May 1968,
described what had occurred as an international conspiracy, instigated by Britain and 
blessed by the United Nations: as barefaced aggression unjustified by a single legal or 
moral principle. As Mr. Acheson helped to draft the Charter, his views may be regarded 
as carrying some weight.
33 The examples given in the text-books are the anti-slave-trading treaties of the 19th 
century, which were to a large extent enforced by Great Britain.
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prisoners would have to stand on trial in the country in which the ship 
was registered.
Alternatively, the Royal Navy might attack a ship with gunfire, 
damaging or destroying it or causing casualties on board.33 The per­
sonnel would not, presumably, be prosecuted by the Crown in England, 
and if a private prosecution were instituted one may suppose that the 
Attorney-General would issue a nolle prosequi. It remains to consider the 
possibility of extradition.
By the Extradition Act, 1870, schedule 1, the list of extraditable 
offences includes, inter alia:
murder and attempt and conspiracy to murder; 
manslaughter;
sinking or destroying a vessel at sea, or attempting or conspiring to 
do so;
assaults on board a ship on the high seas with intent to destroy life 
or to do grievous bodily harm.
However, in order that an offence may be extraditable, it must be of such 
a nature that it would have been an offence if committed in English 
territory ;34 murder, manslaughter and assaults cause no difficulty in this 
respect, but if an attack upon a ship were to be relied on it would be 
necessary to bring it within the Malicious Damage Act, 1861, s. 42 (un­
lawfully and maliciously setting fire to or in anywise destroying a ship), 
s. 45 (unlawfully and maliciously placing or throwing in, into, upon, 
against, or near any ship any gunpowder or other explosive substance, 
with intent to destroy or damage any ship), or s. 46 (unlawfully and 
maliciously damaging, otherwise than by fire, gunpowder or other 
explosive substance any ship with intent to destroy the same or render 
the same useless). Rather remarkably, an attack upon a ship by gunfire 
does not appear to be a separate crime under English law, but it is sub­
mitted that such action would certainly fall within s. 45. The offence in 
question must also be covered by the extradition treaty with the individual 
country concerned :3s and one may suppose that the relevant crimes are 3*5
33 The situation envisaged must be carefully distinguished from that which occurred in 
R. v. Keyn (1876) 2 Ex.D.63 (in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved): in that case the 
defendant was the commanding officer of the Franconia, a German vessel: owing to 
his negligent navigation, the Franconia collided with and sank the British ship Strath­
clyde, killing a passenger on board: he was convicted in England of manslaughter. 
On appeal, it was held that the English court had no jurisdiction to try him as the offence 
had been committed wholly on German territory, but several members of the court 
explained that if he had deliberately rammed, or fired missiles at the Strathclyde, the 
offence would have been committed on the English ship: see the remarks of Sir R. 
Phillimore at 66, Denman J. at 101-2, Grove J. at 115-6 and Cockburn C. J. at 232-8 
and the earlier authoritiees cited.
3« R. r. Dix (1902) 18 T.L.R. 231.
35 In re Arton (No. 2) [1896] 1 Q.B. 509.
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included in extradition treaties with most maritime nations.
As far as I am aware no immunity is afforded by the Extradition 
Acts to Crown servants, and there only remains the question as to whether 
the sort of crime envisaged would be “one of a political character” for 
the purpose of s. 3 of the Act of 1870. There can be little doubt that 
Parliament in passing this provision was inspired by the mid-Victorian 
attitude which regarded insurgents against continental tyrannies as 
heroes who ought to have asylum here even though they had destroyed 
life or property in their struggles,36 and as far as I am aware the protection 
has only been granted in cases of this or a rather similar nature;37 it is 
difficult to believe that the provision was ever designed to protect Crown 
servants or anyone else if they committed an act of aggression upon 
foreign merchants on the high seas.
The conduct of foreign affairs is ultimately a matter for the Royal 
Prerogative, and no doubt the Crown would refuse to surrender its 
servants if extradition proceedings were brought against them: no doubt 
the excuse given by the Home Secretary would be that the alleged crime 
was one of a political nature. It is submitted that such an attitude would 
be wholly unjustifiable on any basis except as an act of state towards a 
foreign power.38
36 See the remarks of Lord Reid in R. v. Governor o f Brixton Prison, ex parte Schtraks 
[1968] A.C. 566 at 583.
37 Re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (murder and other outrages committed by Swiss citizens 
in the course of an insurrection against their government: extradition refused); Re 
Meunier [1894] 1 Q.B. 415 (outrages by anarchists in France: extradition allowed): Re 
Kolczynski [1955] 1 Q.B. 440 (seizure of Polish trawler by crew to escape from Com­
munism: extradition refused).
38 I am greatly indebted to Walter Henderson, LL.D., of Gray’s Inn, barrister-at-law, for 
his assistance in matters relating to international law.
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